A short while ago I tweeted words to the effect that Putin would not invade the Baltic states*. One respondent seemed to assume this meant I supported Putin, but more to the point that I was wrong because other Russian rulers had done it in the past and because people had been sent to Gulags. Alas, an explanation is necessary.
I’ll reiterate the initial point to avoid any confusion: Russia will not invade the Baltics. So, why?
In the first instance, there seem to be two concerns that have led to speculation that Russia may invade: its actions in Ukraine and recent interventions between Russia and the Baltic states – particularly Estonia and Lithuania (not to mention intervention by Baltic states in Ukraine).
The laziest version of the speculation is that Russia’s probable material support for rebels in the east of Ukraine is proof that Putin is the Tzar and Stalin remixed and reanimated: he’s obsessed with gaining some kind of imperial expansion: He invaded Ukraine, therefore he’ll invade the Baltics.
Of course this is a non-sequitur. The situations are rather different. Now, to risk appearing to be an apologist by dealing with facts, the Ukrainian situation is distinct insofar as an elected government (however dodgy) was overthrown. That put Russia in the position of making the (tenuous) claim not just to be upholding the rights of the Russian-speaking minority in the east, but also to be upholding the will of the electorate: as spurious a claim, no doubt, as killing two million Vietnamese in order to save them from their own independence, or killing a million Iraqis to free them. But this is Realpolitik in the real world.
There is no such excuse in relation to the Baltics. No matter how hard Putin will try, it is very unlikely that he can claim the Baltics pose a future threat to Russia’s interests because that “threat” is already manifest.
The manifestation of that threat is in the expansion of NATO and of the EU. It has already happened – the threat of the Ukraine was that it would happen. That is indeed what the dodgy election and subsequent coup was all about – the direction Ukraine would face, the sphere of influence it would choose.
The Baltics have chosen.
This means that Russia has to take a different tactic with them, which it is apparently doing.
Now, Russia, like all big imperially-minded states, seeks to bully and pressure the Baltics. Janina Sleivyte, writing for the UK Defence Academy, explains that Russia hasn’t quite come to terms with the “loss” of the Baltics, so there seems to be a socio-psychological complication to its policies there. Nevertheless, its economic, cultural and political influences are clear. Most importantly, according to Sleivyte, Russia exerts considerable pressure through its almost complete dominance of the energy sector in the Baltics, as it does over the rest of those European states that are dependent upon it.
Indeed, there are aspects of Russian policy in respect of Europe that are wilful. But at the same time, Russia has seen a constant eastwards expansion of the “West”, most threateningly the expansion of NATO and frequent suggestions that missile defence systems should be set up ever closer to its borders. In a sense we see a Cuban Missile Crisis scenario, with Russia trying to push back through a variety of means.
As Sleivyte explains, though,
The umbrella of Euro-Atlantic institutions above the Baltic area and the changed status of the Baltic States dictate a completely new model of Russia’s behaviour: more subtle and covert actions.
This is not to say that the EU and NATO have meant the retreat of Russian influence from the Baltics. Indeed its influence remains
Russia’s economic pressure on the Baltics impedes the consolidation of economic independence or economic ‘de-occupation’ of the states. That said, Baltic membership of NATO (and the EU) cannot guarantee their full ‘de-occupation’.
However, what Sleivyte does suggest is that
With the accession of the Baltic States to NATO, the Baltic security dilemma has been removed from the Alliance’s agenda, i.e. the Baltic security question has been ‘desecuritized’ and became a matter of normal routine politics. Yet, tensions do persist in the so-called ‘low politics’.
It is these “low politics” that persist today, alongside a recent reinvigoration of the security question. Whilst Russia has indeed been undertaking manoeuvres, such as bomber flights, in north and north-west Europe, they are hardly those of a state intent on invasion – that would constitute a very bad poker face! Indeed, the manoeuvres are perhaps better explained as attempts to pressure than as any real military effort.
As Wesley Clark, previously the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, explains, Putin’s words are in large part bluster in this respect, though the bluster appears to have an intent
Russia is constantly testing Nato resolve. We have seen a number of attempts to violate Nato airspace. We have seen very unfortunate incidents, for instance the capture of an Estonian military officer, the detention of a Lithuanian vessel, just to mention a couple of examples.
We are now faced with this new hybrid warfare… so we have to adapt to improve our capability to address [it]… the single most important purpose of this Russian hybrid warfare to try to circumvent the activation of Nato’s Article 5. But we are prepared for that and they won’t succeed.
In the same series of interviews the former Nato Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen is pretty assured of Nato’s resilience:
We have learned lessons from the Russian attack on Ukraine, we have seen that the Russians can act very fast. The single most important thing is to increase Nato presence in the east, and strengthen our collective defence so that the Russians know that if they were to attack a Nato ally they would cross a red line and they would meet not only troops from that specific country but from all Nato allies.
Of course while Nato seems weak to some, the failure to repel an attack on a Nato member would destroy it entirely, would fundamentally undermine relations within Europe and would discredit the US as a global hegemon/defender of “freedom”. That Nato would fail to act is hardly conceivable.
What makes Russia unlikely to attack a Nato member is the sheer imbalance in military force. It is very clear that despite recent increases in military funding, and reductions in much of Europe, Russia is simply outgunned, as most analyses indicate (see below – defence spending on the left, military power index on the right, (both from globalfirepower.com).
Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, it is unlikely that the Russian economy would sustain anything like a war with Nato.
Sleivyte notes that Russia’s primary interest with respect to Europe is economic, making it instrumental for the country’s transformation: it is mainly in Europe that its markets and potential investments lie:
“After EU enlargement, the new ‘common neighbourhood’ has acquired a particular salience because it may stimulate both cooperation and conflict between Russia and Europe. The developments during the last several years have demonstrated that Russia faced a lot of difficulties in exercising her role of the judge or broker in this neighbourhood.”
It is clear that this frustration is now becoming too much. But does this mean that Russia will therefore invade a few small insignificant states in north east Europe in the hope of sorting out its path to world domination? Probably not.
More likely, Russia will turn eastwards.
Sleivyte’s research shows that
Natural resources account for 80 percent of total Russian exports, and energy accounts for 60 percent of resource exports. More than 50 percent of investment flows into the natural resource sector.
And Stratfor report that Russia ‘holds the world’s largest proven reserves of natural gas and continually alternates with Saudi Arabia as the top oil producer. Russia’s economic strength is premised on the energy sector – there aren’t many other games in town, given the nightmare that was the US-led “restructuring” of its economy.
One option it has is simply to export more to the east. This is intimated in Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s article to Horizons. In a rather bitter piece, bemoaning the West’s supposed lack of engagement and cooperation, he suggests that
Turning our country towards the Pacific is a national priority for the twenty-first century, and is directly linked to the dynamic development of Russia’s eastern regions. We would, of course, prefer to take this step in tandem with steps to strengthen our links with Europe
Incidentally, he raises no objection to Serbia’s bid to join the EU – apparently seeing it as a route for Russia to influence the EU
we believe that respectful dialogue and constructive cooperation involving all stakeholders, including contacts between Moscow and Brussels, would help eliminate unnecessary tension, whilst ensuring that Serbia’s EU integration process is beneficial for everyone. Should this approach prevail, rather than being perceived as an apple of discord, Serbia could become a bridge linking the West and the East of our continent.
In a sense, Russia’s energy industry gives it a significant amount of power in Europe, but at the same time, it does make Russia somewhat dependent on EU exports. As Stratfor suggest, however, although Europe gets 1/3 of its gas and oil from Russia (making it indeed over-dependent), Asia presents Russia with a massive and growing market, especially with the West in an ongoing recession.
Russia is thus in a paradox – if energy is its main means to exert influence, it would probably not wish to lose that capacity. Asia may indeed provide the possibility of new markets but that would entail major, and very costly, restructuring in the sector.
The fly in the ointment for Russia right now, though, is that a major war in its major energy markets would be economic suicide, and thereby economically undermine the war effort as its efforts would be extended beyond its means. Such considerations are all the more pertinent when we consider the broader economic picture. The massive global downturn in oil prices means that all nations whose wealth and power are based on oil are experiencing temporary economic problems – the more dependent they are on tax receipts from that sector, the deeper the problem.
As the same time, even a cursory glance at economic indicators shows that Russia’s economy isn’t up to much right now. Indeed the World Bank predicts a contraction in the Russian economy of some 2.9% in 2015. Russia is very good at a-symmetrical warfare against small states and insurgent groups as such conflicts present very little challenge to its economy. War with the West would.
The immediate prospect is continued hybrid warfare. Perhaps a new Cold War, but in military, political and economic terms full scale war is very unlikely. I hope I’m right.
*I was going to post this last night but didn’t. In the meantime, the Latvian Ambassador to the UK spoke on Newsnight last night and stated that he was not worried that Russia would invade, but more, as I argue here, that it would be unclear how its influence would be exerted.
Mediations and politics 